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Consenting to Searches Mter Being Arrested: 
Pretrial Drug Testing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pretrial drug testing procedures help government au-
thorities determine which arrestees can be safely released and 
allow them to monitor and treat drug users. Thus, as the use of 
drugs increases, the desire of governments to implement pretri-
al drug testing procedures continues to grow. 1 Many state and 
local governments that have implemented testing procedures 
believe that mandatory pretrial drug testing, without obtaining 
the consent of the arrestee, is constitutional.2 Nonetheless, 
many officials continue to conduct their programs on a volun-
tary basis by asking the prisoner to consent to a drug test be-
fore obtaining a sample.3 This comment assumes that consent 
is required by the constitution and thus focuses solely on the 
question of whether an arrestee can validly give consent to a 
pretrial drug test. 
Part II will first identify the Fourth Amendment 
protections afforded to prisoners and will discuss whether these 
protections can be waived. Part III will identify those situa-
tions under which an arrestee can waive his constitutional 
rights by consenting to participate in a pretrial drug test. This 
section will also identify those situations when an arrestee's 
consent is invalid. Part IV will discuss whether an arrestee's 
consent to participate in a pretrial drug test remains valid 
when it is subsequently determined that the arrest was illegal. 
1. National Drug Control Strategy, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1308, 
1309 (Sept. 5, 1989) (calling for expanded drug testing at every stage of the 
criminal justice system, including the pretrial stage). 
2. The basis for the officials' belief that mandatory pretrial drug testing of 
prisoners is constitutional stems from past court decisions. In the premier drug 
testing case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Supreme Court 
held that "when the subject of a search is not in custody ... the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require [the state to] demonstrate that the consent was in 
fact voluntarily given .... " ld. at 248 (emphasis added); see also Spence v. Far-
rier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding random drug testing of prisoners 
because prisoners have a limited expectation of privacy in their prison cells). 
3. Because the courts have yet to hold that mandatory pretrial drug testing is 
legal, the states have proceeded cautiously and have usually sought to obtain the 
arrestee's consent before conducting drug tests. 
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Finally, this comment concludes by summarizing the decisions 
of the courts. 
II. WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS GUARANTEED 
BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The United States Constitution protects every citizen from 
unreasonable searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.4 
Thus, under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officials 
are generally required to obtain a search warrant before con-
ducting a drug test on an individual. 5 
However, the Supreme Court has identified an exception to 
this general rule: "It is ... well settled that one of the specifi-
cally established exceptions to the requirements of both a war-
rant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant 
to consent."6 Therefore, if a person consents to participate in a 
drug test, he has effectively waived the protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures that was afforded him by the 
Fourth Amendment. 7 
In order for a person's consent to be valid, consent must be 
"voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, 
express or implied."8 If consent to search is coerced in any 
fashion, the search will violate the Fourth Amendment and will 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
5. Note that this may not be necessary for individuals who already have been 
arrested. See supra note 2 and accompanying text . 
6. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted). 
7. See United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. 
Reeve v United States, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) (holding that a person in custody may 
voluntarily consent to a search); see also Sally Anne Cooper, Development in the 
Law-The Constitutional Issues of Drug Testing in the Workplace, 23 WILLAME'ITE 
1. REV. 553, 560·61 (1987). 
8. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248; see also Paul R. Joseph, Testing for Drug Use 
in the American Workplace: Fourth Amendment Implications of Public Sector Work 
Place Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 605, 624-26 (1987); Gloria L. Freye, Note, 
Firing Employees for Refusing to Submit to Urinalysis: The Case for a Uniform 
Standard of Reasonable Individualized Suspicion, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 75, 83-84 
(1988); Cooper, supra note 7, at 560-61. 
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be invalid.9 Thus, by consenting to an otherwise unreasonable 
search, a citizen can deprive himself of valuable constitutional 
protections. 
Because of the seriousness of the constitutional protections 
involved, the courts protect individuals by placing the burden 
on the state to prove that an individual's consent was in fact 
voluntarily given. 10 The Supreme Court has stated that 
"where the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has 
the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained 
and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is 
not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful 
authority."11 In addition, many courts seem to require the 
state to establish the existence of consent by the higher stan-
dard of "clear and convincing" evidence. 12 
These rules often prove to be a barrier to a state that is 
trying to show that an arrestee voluntarily consented to partici-
pate in a pretrial drug test. Whether the state will be able to 
overcome this burden depends on the procedures and circum-
stances that were in place at the time of the testing. The im-
pact of these different procedures and circumstances on the 
courts' decisions are discussed in the following 
section. 
Ill. DETERMINING WHETHER A PERSON UNDER LEGITIMATE 
STATE ARREST VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO PARTICIPATE IN 
PRETRIAL DRUG TESTING 
The determination of whether an arrestee voluntarily con-
sented to be tested for drugs is extremely important. 13 Howev-
er, determining whether the consent was in fact voluntarily 
given is not an easy task. There are no clear rules to follow. 
Instead, it "is a question of fact to be determined from the to-
tality of all the circumstances."14 However, the courts have 
9. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. 
10. ld. at 248 n.7; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 
(1980); Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 517 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. 
Singletary v Tukes, 112 S. Ct. 273 (1991). See generally Diane G. Schwartz, Note, 
Mandatory Drug Testing of Public Sector Employees: Constitutional Implications, 65 
U. DET. L. REV. 315, 328 (1988). 
11. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). 
12. See United States v. Garcia, 866 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989); State v. Robin-
son, 391 So. 2d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Theroux, 306 A.2d 44 (R.I. 
1973). 
13. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
14. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
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identified some of the circumstances that are important to 
consider when determining whether an arrestee's consent was 
voluntary. 
Circumstances deemed relevant by the courts in determin-
ing voluntariness fall into two categories: (1) those affecting an 
arrestee's ability to consent to drug testing and (2) those sug-
gesting that the arrestee's consent may have been coerced 
rather than voluntary. 15 Thus, in order to prove voluntary 
consent, the state must first prove that the arrestee had the 
ability to consent, afterwhich the state must also prove that the 
arrestee did consent and that the consent was purely voluntary 
and not coerced. Those circumstances relevant to a determina-
tion under each prong are addressed below. 
A. Circumstances Affecting an Arrestee's Ability to Consent 
Before a person can voluntarily consent to a search and 
seizure, he must be capable of giving a valid consent. Thus, the 
courts will readily consider factors such as the arrestee's 
knowledge that he can refuse to consent, his ability to speak 
English, his intelligence and education, his experience and 
sophistication, and his age. 16 Each of these circumstances are 
discussed below. 
1. Knowledge of right to refuse 
In the famous case of Miranda v. Arizona/7 the Supreme 
Court held that a person could not waive his constitutional 
right against self-incrimination until he had been informed of 
both his right to refuse waiver and the possible consequences of 
waiver. 18 Because obtaining a voluntary confession is very 
similar to obtaining a voluntary consent to a search and sei-
zure, it initially appeared that the Miranda rule may have 
applied to search and seizures as well. 19 If the Miranda rule 
U.S. 544, 557 (1980); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1005 (1991); United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1982); 
Freye, supra note 8, at 83-84. 
15. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 238 n.25 (citations omitted) (drawing a dis-
tinction between the determination of whether consent was voluntarily given and 
the determination of whether consent was knowingly given). 
16. See Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 517 (11th Cir. 1990). 
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
18. !d. at 475-79. 
19. See State v. Williams, 432 P.2d 679 (Or. 1967) (holding that Miranda 
warning requirements apply to interrogation aimed at obtaining defendant's conscnl 
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did apply to search and seizure cases, no citizen would be able 
to voluntarily consent to a search and seizure unless he had 
been informed of his right to refuse to consent to the search. 
All doubts as to the applicability of Miranda to search and 
seizure cases were cleared up by the Supreme Court in the case 
of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.20 This case rejected the notion 
that the Miranda rule was applicable in any way to search and 
siezure cases and held that a voluntary consent to a search can 
be found even in situations where state officials do not advise 
the subject of the search of his right of refusat21 The Court 
plainly stated that "[k]nowledge of a right to refuse is not a 
prerequisite of a voluntary consent."22 Thus, an arrestee's con-
sent to participate in a drug test can still be voluntary, even 
though he may not have been informed of his right to refuse. 
While an arrestee's knowledge of his right to refuse may 
not be essential, it is nonetheless an important factor consid-
ered by the courts in determining whether the arrestee had the 
capacity to consent.23 The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]-
lthough the Constitution does not require 'proof of knowledge of 
a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a 
search,' such knowledge [is] highly relevant to the determina-
tion that there had been consent."24 Thus, while failing to in-
form an arrestee of his right to refuse a drug test may not be 
determinitive in and of itself, the failure to inform may operate 
in conjunction with other circumstances to render the arrestee's 
consent ineffective.25 State drug testing officials should there-
fore give serious consideration to informing arrestees of their 
right to refuse to participate in pretrial drug tests. By doing so 
the state will increase the likelihood that its voluntary drug 
tests will be upheld. 26 
to search). 
20. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
21. ld. at 231-34. 
22. ld. at 234. 
23. See ld. at 226-27; United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(stating that warning to defendant is only one factor to consider); United States v. 
Smith, 543 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1110 (1977) (warning 
defendant that he had a right to refuse to consent was only one factor to be 
considered). 
24. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1980) (quoting 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)) (emphasis in original). 
25. See United States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Trombley, 563 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that state's failure to warn 
the defendant that she could refuse to consent to the search, along with other 
circumstances such as deceit, rendered the search and seizure invalid). 
26. See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982) (consenting to a 
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2. Ability to speak English 
The courts will look at an arrestee's language abilities 
when determining whether the person had the ability to con-
sent to a search. If an arrestee is limited in his ability to speak 
and understand English, the courts are less likely to find that 
he has the capacity to voluntarily consent to a search.27 In 
such situations, the court may impose a heavier burden of proof 
on the state to show voluntary consent.28 However, the 
arrestee's language abilities are only one factor to consider and 
are not determinative in and of themselves. 
3. Education and intelligence 
Other factors the courts consider are the arrestee's edu-
cation and intelligence.29 If the arrestee has had little edu-
cation or has low intelligence, the courts are less likely to find 
that the arrestee was capable of giving voluntary consent. 30 
Apparently, the policy underlying this consideration is that a 
person cannot voluntarily consent to waive a right if he does 
not know that the right exists or cannot fully comprehend the 
right. 
4. Experience and sophistication 
The experience and sophistication of an arrestee are also 
important to consider when determining whether the arrestee 
search was valid when the party on whom the search was imposed consented to 
the search after being informed that he had the right to refuse to consent); United 
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976) (holding that consent was valid 
when defendant was informed that he had a right to refuse to consent). 
27. United States v. Gallego-Zapata, 630 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding 
that the fact that searchee had limited abilities with the English language, along 
with the fact that he was unfamiliar with his rights, rendered consent to search 
involuntary). 
28. United States v. Wai Lau, 329 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 
856 (1964) 
29. "The traditional definition of voluntariness has always taken into account 
evidence of minimal schooling [and] low intelligence .... " Tukes v. Dugger, 911 
F.2d 508, 516 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
248 (1973)). 
30. See Tukes, 911 F.2d at 516; United States v. Gallego-Zapata, 630 F. Supp. 
665 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding that searchee's lack of familiarity with the constitu-
tion and its rights, among other factors, showed that his consent to the search was 
not voluntary); cf United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (holding that 
arrestee with 11th grade education had sufficient understanding to consent to a 
search). 
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can voluntarily submit to a drug test. The greater the 
arrestee's sophistication or the more experience the arrestee 
has had with the legal system, the more likely it is that the 
court will find the arrestee capable of giving a valid consent.31 
5. Age 
When determining whether an arrestee consented to par-
ticipate in a drug test, the courts may also consider the age of 
the arrestee.32 The younger the arrestee, the less likely it is 
that the arrestee is capable of giving a voluntary consent.33 
B. Circumstances Affecting the Voluntarism of an Arrestee's 
Consent 
In order for an arrestee to validly consent to a search and 
seizure (such as a drug test), the arrestee's consent must be 
completely voluntary.34 Coercion or duress can play no part in 
the arrestee's decision.35 Otherwise, the courts will find that 
the consent was not voluntary and will invalidate the search 
and seizure. 36 
The courts look at a wide variety of facts and circumstanc-
es in order to determine whether consent to a search was given 
voluntarily.37 These factors are considered below. 
1. Consenting while under arrest 
While some people may argue that consent given behind 
bars cannot be truly voluntary, the courts have ruled other-
wise. Consent to search may be voluntary, even though it is 
given by a person in police custody.38 Thus, the fact that a 
31. See United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (hold-
ing that sophistication of middle-aged businessman helped to render his consent 
valid); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976) (indicating that 
searchee's prior arrest for mail fraud evidenced his familiarity with the law and 
thus was a factor in establishing that his consent to search was voluntary and 
valid). 
32. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (indicating that the 
age of 22-year-old searchee was a factor in showing that consent was voluntary). 
33. See People v. Kincaid, 367 N.E.2d 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (indicating that 
age of 16-year-old girl was a factor in establishing that she did not voluntarily 
consent to search). 
34. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
35. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). 
36. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
37. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
38. United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1981); see also United 
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person has been arrested does not mean that he cannot consent 
to a drug test. 
However, the courts have stated that the act of obtaining 
consent from a person in custody is inherently suspect.39 
Many courts have accordingly held that the government is 
under a heavier burden of proof when it is trying to show that 
an arrestee voluntarily consented to a search.40 Government 
officials should therefore be aware that it will be harder to 
show voluntary consent when the consenting person was under 
arrest. 
2. Presence of coercive factors 
When determining whether an arrestee's consent was vol-
untary, the court will search for any circumstance that sug-
gests that there may have been coercion.41 The existence of a 
coercive condition will weigh in the court's consideration, al-
though it will probably not be determinative by itself. However, 
the existence of multiple coercive factors may be enough to tip 
the scales against a finding of voluntary consent. 
The courts have identified a number of actions that will be 
considered to be coercive when made by government officers. 
These actions include brandishing weapons,42 handcuffing the 
searchee,43 interrogating the searchee,44 making threats,45 
States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that an arrestee has capacity 
to voluntarily consent); United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976) (in-
dicating that an arrest did not destroy voluntary status of search); United States 
v. Allison, 616 F.2d 779 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 857 (1980) (consenting to 
a search of car was valid even though defendant was under arrest). 
39. United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976). 
40. See Kirvelaitis v. Gray, 513 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 
(1975); State v. Robinson, 391 So. 2d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Lightford v. 
State, 520 P.2d 955 (Nev. 1974). 
41. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973); Tukes v. Dugger, 
911 F.2d 508 (11th Cir. 1990). 
42. See United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
4 76 U.S. 1144 (1986) (holding that searchee did not voluntarily consent to search 
where police officers stood over him with drawn guns); United States v. Perez, 644 
F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that consent was coerced where government 
officials approached with drawn guns); United States v. Kimball, fi55 F. Supp. 1366 
(D. Me. 1983), affd, 741 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the display of 
weapons in the course of an arrest may constitute a significant indicator of a 
coerced consent to a search); United States v. Whitlock, 418 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. 
Mich. 1976), affd without opinion, 556 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that 
consent to search was involuntary when defendant was approached at gunpoint and 
handcuffed). 
43. See United States v. Whitlock, 418 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding 
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and acting deceitfully.46 
3. Denial of guilt by arrestee 
Many courts hold that after a person denies guilt, he can-
not voluntarily consent to a search that produces incriminating 
evidenceY The rationale behind this view is that "no sane 
man who denies his guilt would actually be willing [to 
have] policemen search his room for contraband which is cer-
tain to be discovered."48 Thus, under this rule an arrestee 
would not be able to voluntarily consent to a drug test if he had 
denied using drugs. 
Not all courts adopt this view. A few courts take the oppo-
site approach and hold that a denial of guilt supports a finding 
of voluntary consent.49 There does not appear to be a majority 
rule on this issue. Thus, the effect of an arrestee's denial of 
guilt on his ability to consent to drug testing remains uncer-
tain. 
4. Evasive and uncooperative behavior of arrestee 
If an arrestee continuously refuses to cooperate with the 
efforts of government officers, the courts will view this as evi-
dence that the arrestee did not voluntarily consent to partici-
pate in the drug test. 50 When consent is nonetheless obtained 
that consent was involuntary when defendant was approached at gunpoint and 
handcuffed); cf United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 1007 (1988) (handcuffing of defendant does not require the court to find 
coercion). 
44. United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975) (indicating that con-
sent was invalid when defendant was interrogated and threatened); United States 
v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that consent was coerced when 
weapons were drawn and defendants were separated for interrogation). 
45. See United States v. Ocheltree, 622 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that 
consent was coerced when officer threatened to obtain a search warrant); United 
States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975) (concluding that consent was invalid 
when defendant was interrogated and threatened); United States v. Blakeney, 579 
F. Supp. 1197 (D.D.C. 1983) (threatening that a search warrant could be obtained 
immediately constituted coercion). 
46. See United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1954) (indicating 
that consent was invalid when agent pretended to be on premises for business 
purpose). 
47. See Higgins v. United States, 2G9 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
48. !d. at 820. 
49. See People v. Fahrner, 213 Ca. App. 2d 535, 28 Cal. Rptr. 926 (1963). 
50. See United States v. Yan, 704 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that 
when arrestee manifested a desire not to cooperate with authorities, his consent to 
search was not valid). 
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from such a reluctant prisoner, the courts often tend to think 
that the consent may have been coerced.51 Thus, governments 
should be aware that when an arrestee attempts to avoid par-
ticipation in a drug test but later consents, the courts may not 
be willing to find that the consent was voluntary. 
5. Manner and intonation of arrestee's consent 
The manner in which the arrestee consented to a search 
may play a big role in the determination of whether the con-
sent was voluntary. If the court determines that the arrestee's 
acquiescence to the search was in the nature of resignation 
rather than voluntary waiver, the court will be more likely to 
invalidate the consent.52 On the other hand, if the arrestee 
assisted authorities in conducting the search, courts are more 
willing to find that the consent was voluntarily made. 53 
IV. DETERMINING WHETHER A PERSON WHO WAS ARRESTED 
ILLEGALLY CAN VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN 
PRETRIAL DRUG TESTING 
Occasionally, situations may arise where a consenting 
arrestee turns out to be illegally detained. These situations 
raise an issue as to whether the arrestee's consent can still be 
effective. 
Many courts have held that an arrestee's consent to a 
search is invalid when it is subsequently determined that the 
arrest was illegal.54 This holding is apparently intended to 
protect illegally detained citizens who consent to a search while 
51. See id. But see State v. Hauser, 125 S.E.2d 389 (N.C. 1962) (holding that 
consent was valid even though defendant initially denied having possession to the 
key to his trunk); Longo v. State, 26 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1946) (consenting to search 
was voluntary even though the arrestee attempted to elude the police in his car). 
52. See United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
53. See United States v. Allison, 616 F.2d 779, 783 (5th Cir. 1980) (consenting 
to search was valid when arrestee opened the trunk of his car for inspection by 
government officers). 
54. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 589 (9th Cir. 
1988) (indicating that when a search has been determined to be constitutionally 
unreasonable, the consent feature cannot save it.); National Fed'n of Fed. Employ-
ees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a search oth-
erwise unreasonable cannot be redeemed by an exaction of consent); United States 
v. Moreno, 742 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that illegally detained consent to 
search was tainted by illegality and was ineffective); United States v. Berryman, 
717 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that arrestee could not consent to a search 
after he had been illegally detained). 
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under the false belief that they are lawfully held. This protec-
tion is important because many people may be willing to con-
sent to a search while in custody although they would not have 
consented under normal conditions. 
When an illegally detained person consents to a search 
after learning of the illegal detention, the courts are not so 
strict. Many courts will allow an illegally detained person to 
voluntarily consent to a search in this type of situation.55 How-
ever, the courts usually hold that the consent becomes tainted 
by the illegal detention. 56 Thus, in order to show valid consent 
in instances where a suspect has been illegally detained, the 
government must establish not only that the consent was vol-
untarily given, but also "that there were intervening circum-
stances sufficient to dissipate the taint of illegal detention."57 
This is a significantly heavier burden. 
Thus, the validity of a consent to search obtained from an 
illegally-held detainee depends on when the detainee's consent 
was given. If the consent was given while the detainee believed 
that he was lawfully held, the consent was involuntary and is 
invalid.58 On the other hand, if the consent was given after 
the arrestee learned of the illegal detention, the consent may 
be valid if the government is able to overcome the taint of the 
illegality. 59 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment protects every citizen from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. However, citizens may waive 
this protection if they do so voluntarily. The government has 
the burden of proving that an arrestee's consent to participate 
in pretrial drug testing was voluntary. For this determination, 
the courts will consider both the arrestee's ability to consent 
and the presence of any coercive circumstances. 
Relevant to the courts consideration of the arrestee's abili-
55. See United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981) (indicating that 
the fact that defendant was subject of an illegal arrest and search did not render 
invalid his consent to a subsequent search). 
56. United States v. Suarez, 694 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Ga. 1988), affd, 885 F.2d 
1574 (11th Cir. 1989). 
57. !d. at 933; see also United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Foster, 566 F. Supp. 1403 (D.D.C. 1983). 
58. United States v. Suarez, 694 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Ga. 1988), affd, 885 F.2d 
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ty to consent are: (1) the arrestee's knowledge of his right tore-
fuse to consent; (2) the arrestee's ability to speak and under-
stand English; (3) the arrestee's education and intelligence; (4) 
the arrestee's experience and sophistication; and (5) the 
arrestee's age. 
When looking for coercive circumstances, the courts will 
consider whether (1) the consenting person was under arrest; 
(2) the government officials used weapons, handcuffs, interro-
gation, threats, and deceit; (3) the arrestee denied guilt; and (4) 
the arrestee's behavior was evasive and uncooperative. While 
none of these factors are likely to be determinative by them-
selves, they are all circumstances that the courts will consider 
when determining whether there was voluntary consent. 
When a person has been illegally arrested, his ability to 
consent to a search depends on when the consent was given. If 
the consent was given before the arrestee learned of the illegal 
arrest, the consent is invalid. If the consent is given after-
wards, the consent may be valid if the government can over-
come the taint of the illegality by introducing evidence of inter-
vening circumstances. 
David R. Nielson 
